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Abstract 
We build a theoretical model of multi-product firms that highlights how competition across market 
destinations affects both a firm's exported product range and product mix. We show how tougher 
competition in an export market induces a firm to skew its export sales towards its best performing 
products. We find very strong confirmation of this competitive effect for French exporters across 
export market destinations. Theoretically, this within firm change in product mix driven by the trading 
environment has important repercussions on firm productivity. A calibrated fit to our theoretical 
model reveals that these productivity effects are potentially quite large. 
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1 Introduction
Exports by multi-product firms dominate world trade flows. Variations in these trade flows across
destinations reflect in part the decisions by multi-product firms to vary the range of their exported
products across destinations with different market conditions.1 In this paper, we further analyze
the effects of those export market conditions on the relative export sales of those goods: we refer
to this as the firm’s product mix choice. We build a theoretical model of multi-product firms that
highlights how market size and geography (the market sizes of, and bilateral economic distances
to, trading partners) affect both a firm’s exported product range and its exported product mix
across market destinations. Differences in market sizes and geography generate differences in the
toughness of competition across markets. Tougher competition shifts down the entire distribution
of markups across products and induces firms to skew their export sales towards their better per-
forming products. We find very strong confirmation of this competitive effect for French exporters
across export market destinations. Our theoretical model shows how this effect of export market
competition on a firm’s product mix then translates into differences in measured firm productivity:
when a firm skews its production towards better performing products, it also allocates relatively
more workers to the production of those goods and raises its overall output (and sales) per worker.
Thus, a firm producing a given set of products with given unit input requirements will produce rela-
tively more output and sales per worker (across products) when it exports to markets with tougher
competition. To our knowledge, this is a new channel through which competition (both in export
markets and at home) affects firm-level productivity. This effect of competition on firm-level pro-
ductivity is compounded by another channel that operates through the endogenous response of the
firm’s product range: firms respond to increased competition by dropping their worst performing
products.2
Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2010) also build theoretical models of multi-
product firms that highlight the effect of competition on the distribution of firm product sales.
Both models incorporate the cannibalization effect that occurs as large firms expand their product
range. In our model, we rely on the competition effects from the demand side, which are driven by
variations in the number of sellers and their average prices across export markets. The cannibaliza-
1See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for Europe, Bernard et al (2007) for the U.S., and Arkolakis and Muendler
(2010) for Brazil.
2Bernard et al (2011) and Eckel and Neary (2010) emphasize this second channel. They show how trade lib-
eralization between symmetric countries induces firms to drop their worst performing products (a focus on “core
competencies”) leading to intra-firm productivity gains. We discuss those papers in further detail below.
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tion effect does not occur as a continuum of firms each produce a discrete number of products and
thus never attain finite mass. The benefits of this simplification is that we can consider an open
economy equilibrium with multiple asymmetric countries and asymmetric trade barriers whereas
Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2010) restrict their analysis to a single globalized
world with no trade barriers. Thus, our model is able to capture the key role of geography in
shaping differences in competition across export market destinations.3
Another approach to the modeling of multi-product firms relies on a nested C.E.S. structure
for preferences, where a continuum of firms produce a continuum of products. The cannibalization
effect is ruled out by restricting the nests in which firms can introduce new products. Allanson
and Montagna (2005) consider such a model in a closed economy, while Arkolakis and Muendler
(2010) and Bernard et al (2011) develop extensions to open economies. Given the C.E.S. structure
of preferences and the continuum assumptions, markups across all firms and products are exoge-
nously fixed. Thus, differences in market conditions or proportional reductions in trade costs have
no effect on a firm’s product mix choice (the relative distribution of export sales across products).
In contrast, variations in markups across destinations (driven by differences in competition) gen-
erate differences in relative exports across destinations in our model: a given firm selling the same
two products across different markets will export relatively more of the better performing product
in markets where competition is tougher. In our comprehensive data covering nearly all French
exports, we find that there is substantial variation in this relative export ratio across French export
destinations, and that this variation is consistently related to differences in market size and geogra-
phy across those destinations (market size and geography both affect the toughness of competition
across destinations). French exporters substantially skew their export sales towards their better
performing products in markets where they face tougher competition.
Theoretically, we show how this effect of tougher competition in an export market on the
exported product mix is also associated with an increase in productivity for the set of exported
products to that market. We show how firm-level measures of exported output per worker as well as
deflated sales per worker for a given export destination (counting only the exported units to a given
destination and the associated labor used to produce those units) increase with tougher competition
in that destination. This effect of competition on firm productivity holds even when one fixes the
3Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Baldwin and Gu (2009) also develop models with multi-product firms and a pro-
competitive effect coming from the demand side. These models investigate the effects of globalization on a firm’s
product scope and average production levels per product. However, those models consider the case of firms producing
symmetric products whereas we focus on the effects of competition on the within-firm distribution of product sales.
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set of products exported, thus eliminating any potential effects from the extensive (product) margin
of trade. Then, the firm-level productivity increase is entirely driven by the response of the firm’s
product mix: producing relatively more of the better performing products raises measured firm
productivity. We use our theoretical model to calibrate the relationship between the skewness of
the French exporters’ product mix and a productivity average for those exporters. We find that our
measured variation in product mix skewness across destinations corresponds to large differences in
productivity. The effect of a doubling of destination country GDP on the French exporters’ product
mix corresponds to a measured productivity differential between 4% and 7%.
Our model also features a response of the extensive margin of trade: tougher competition in the
domestic market induces firms to reduce the set of produced products, and tougher competition in
an export market induces exporters to reduce the set of exported products. We do not emphasize
these results for the extensive margin, because they are quite sensitive to the specification of fixed
production and export costs. In order to maintain the tractability of our multi-country asymmetric
open economy, we abstract from those fixed costs (increasing returns are generated uniquely from
the fixed/sunk entry cost). Conditional on the production and export of given sets of products,
such fixed costs would not affect the relative production or export levels of those products. These
are the product mix outcomes that we emphasize (and for which we find strong empirical support).
Although we focus our empirical analysis on the cross-section of export destinations for French
exporters, other studies have examined the effects of trade liberalization over time on the extensive
and intensive margins of production and trade. Baldwin and Gu (2009), Bernard et al (2011),
and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) all show how trade liberalization in North America induced
(respectively) Canadian, U.S., and Mexican firms to reduce the number of products they produce.
Baldwin and Gu (2009) and Bernard et al (2011) further report that CUSFTA induced a significant
increase in the skewness of production across products (an increase in entropy). This could be due
to an extensive margin effect if it were driven by production increases for newly exported goods
following CUSTA, or to an intensive margin effect if it were driven by the increased skewness of
domestic and export sales (a product mix response). Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) report that this
second channel was dominant for the case of Mexico. They show that Mexican firms expanded
their exports of their better performing products (higher market shares) significantly more than
those for their worse performing exported products during the period of trade expansion from 1994-
2003. They also directly compare the relative contributions of the extensive and intensive product
margins of Mexican firms’ exports to the U.S.. They find that changes in the product mix explain
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the preponderance of the changes in the export patterns of Mexican firms. Arkolakis and Muendler
(2010) find a similar result for the export patterns of Brazilian firms to the U.S.: Because the
firms’ exported product mix is so skewed, changes at the extensive margin contribute very little to
a firm’s overall exports (the newly exported products have very small market shares relative to the
better performing products previously exported).
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first develop a closed economy version of our model in
order to focus on the endogenous responses of a firm’s product scope and product mix to market
conditions. We highlight how competition affects the skewness of a firm’s product mix, and how this
translates into differences in firm productivity. Thus, even in a closed economy, increases in market
size lead to increases in within-firm productivity via this product mix response. We then develop
the open economy version of our model with multiple asymmetric countries and an arbitrary matrix
of bilateral trade costs. The equilibrium connects differences in market size and geography to the
toughness of competition in every market, and how the latter shapes a firm’s exported product
mix to that destination. We then move on to our empirical test for this exported product mix
response for French firms. We show how destination market size as well as its geography induce
increased skewness in the firms’ exported product mix to that destination. In the last section before
concluding we quantify the economic significance of those measured differences in export skewness
for productivity.
2 Closed Economy
Our model is based on an extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) that allows firms to endoge-
nously determine the set of products that they produce. We start with a closed economy version
of this model where L consumers each supply one unit of labor.
2.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω, and a ho-
mogenous good chosen as numeraire. All consumers share the same utility function given by
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci )
2 di− 1
2
η
(∫
i∈Ω
qcidi
)2
, (1)
where qc0 and q
c
i represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and each variety
i. The demand parameters α, η, and γ are all positive. The parameters α and η index the
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substitution pattern between the differentiated varieties and the numeraire: increases in α and
decreases in η both shift out the demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire.
The parameter γ indexes the degree of product differentiation between the varieties. In the limit
when γ = 0, consumers only care about their consumption level over all varieties, Qc =
∫
i∈Ω q
c
idi,
and the varieties are then perfect substitutes. The degree of product differentiation increases with
γ as consumers give increasing weight to smoothing consumption levels across varieties.
Our specification of preferences intentionally does not distinguish between the varieties produced
by the same firm relative to varieties produced by other firms. We do not see any clear reason to
enforce that varieties produced by a firm be closer substitutes than varieties produced by different
firms – or vice-versa. Of course, some firms operate across sectors, in which case the varieties
produced in different sectors would be more differentiated than varieties produced by other firms
within the same sector. We eliminate those cross-sector, within firm, varieties in our empirical work
by restricting our analysis to the range of varieties produced by a firm within a sector classification.
The marginal utilities for all varieties are bounded, and a consumer may not have positive de-
mand for any particular variety. We assume that consumers have positive demand for the numeraire
good (qc0 > 0). The inverse demand for each variety i is then given by
pi = α− γqci − ηQc, (2)
whenever qci > 0. Let Ω
∗ ⊂ Ω be the subset of varieties that are consumed (such that qci > 0).
Equation (2) can then be inverted to yield the linear market demand system for these varieties:
qi ≡ Lqci =
αL
ηM + γ
− L
γ
pi +
ηM
ηM + γ
L
γ
p¯, ∀i ∈ Ω∗, (3)
where M is the measure of consumed varieties in Ω∗ and p¯ = (1/M)
∫
i∈Ω∗ pidi is their average price.
The set Ω∗ is the largest subset of Ω that satisfies
pi ≤ 1
ηM + γ
(γα+ ηMp¯) ≡ pmax, (4)
where the right hand side price bound pmax represents the price at which demand for a variety is
driven to zero. Note that (2) implies pmax ≤ α. In contrast to the case of C.E.S. demand, the
price elasticity of demand, εi ≡ |(∂qi/∂pi) (pi/qi)| = [(pmax/pi)− 1]−1 , is not uniquely determined
by the level of product differentiation γ. Given the latter, lower average prices p¯ or a larger
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number of competing varieties M induce a decrease in the price bound pmax and an increase in
the price elasticity of demand εi at any given pi. We characterize this as a ‘tougher’ competitive
environment.4
Welfare can be evaluated using the indirect utility function associated with (1):
U = Ic +
1
2
(
η +
γ
M
)−1
(α− p¯)2 + 1
2
M
γ
σ2p, (5)
where Ic is the consumer’s income and σ2p = (1/M)
∫
i∈Ω∗ (pi − p¯)2 di represents the variance of
prices. To ensure positive demand levels for the numeraire, we assume that Ic >
∫
i∈Ω∗ piq
c
idi =
p¯Qc−Mσ2p/γ. Welfare naturally rises with decreases in average prices p¯. It also rises with increases
in the variance of prices σ2p (holding the mean price p¯ constant), as consumers then re-optimize their
purchases by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as the numeraire good.5
Finally, the demand system exhibits ‘love of variety’: holding the distribution of prices constant
(namely holding the mean p¯ and variance σ2p of prices constant), welfare rises with increases in
product variety M .
2.2 Production and Firm Behavior
Labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The
numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit cost; its market is also compet-
itive. These assumptions imply a unit wage. Entry in the differentiated product sector is costly as
each firm incurs product development and production startup costs. Subsequent production of each
variety exhibits constant returns to scale. While it may decide to produce more than one variety,
each firm has one key variety corresponding to its ‘core competency’. This is associated with a
core marginal cost c (equal to unit labor requirement).6 Research and development yield uncertain
outcomes for c, and firms learn about this cost level only after making the irreversible investment
fE required for entry. We model this as a draw from a common (and known) distribution G(c)
with support on [0, cM ].
A firm can introduce any number of new varieties, but each additional variety entails an addi-
4We also note that, given this competitive environment (given N and p¯), the price elasticity εi monotonically
increases with the price pi along the demand curve.
5This welfare measure reflects the reduced consumption of the numeraire to account for the labor resources used
to cover the entry costs.
6We use the same concept of a firm’s core competency as Eckel and Neary (2010). For simplicity, we do not model
any fixed production costs. This would significantly increase the complexity of our model without yielding much new
insight.
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tional customization cost as it pulls a firm away from its core competency. This entails incrementally
higher marginal costs of production for those varieties. The divergence from a firm’s core compe-
tency may also be reflected in diminished product quality/appeal. For simplicity, we maintain
product symmetry on the demand side and capture any decrease in product appeal as an increased
production cost. We refer to this incremental production cost as a customization cost.
We index by m the varieties produced by the same firm in increasing order of distance from
their core competency m = 0 (the firm’s core variety). We then denote v(m, c) the marginal cost
for variety m produced by a firm with core marginal cost c and assume v(m, c) = ω−mc with
ω ∈ (0, 1). This defines a firm-level ‘competence ladder’ with geometrically increasing customiza-
tion costs. This modeling approach is isomorphic to one where we label the product ladder as
reflecting decreasing quality/product appeal and insert the geometric term as a preference param-
eter multiplying quantities in the utility function (1). Our modeling approach also nests the case
of single-product firms as the geometric step size becomes arbitrarily large (ω goes to zero); firms
will then only be able to produce their core variety.
Since the entry cost is sunk, firms that can cover the marginal cost of their core variety survive
and produce. All other firms exit the industry. Surviving firms maximize their profits using the
residual demand function (3). In so doing, those firms take the average price level p¯ and total
number of varieties M as given. This monopolistic competition outcome is maintained with multi-
product firms as any firm can only produce a countable number of products, which is a subset of
measure zero of the total mass of varieties M .
The profit maximizing price p(v) and output level q(v) of a variety with cost v must then satisfy
q(v) =
L
γ
[p(v)− v] . (6)
The profit maximizing price p(v) may be above the price bound pmax from (4), in which case the
variety is not supplied. Let vD reference the cutoff cost for a variety to be profitably produced. This
variety earns zero profit as its price is driven down to its marginal cost, p(vD) = vD = p
max, and
its demand level q(vD) is driven to zero. Let r(v) = p(v)q(v), pi(v) = r(v)− q(v)v, λ(v) = p(v)− v
denote the revenue, profit, and (absolute) markup of a variety with cost v. All these performance
7
measures can then be written as functions of v and vD only:
7
p(v) =
1
2
(vD + v) , (7)
λ(v) =
1
2
(vD − v) ,
q(v) =
L
2γ
(vD − v) ,
r(v) =
L
4γ
[
(vD)
2 − v2
]
,
pi(v) =
L
4γ
(vD − v)2 .
The threshold cost vD thus summarizes the competitive environment for the performance mea-
sures of all produced varieties. As expected, lower cost varieties have lower prices and earn higher
revenues and profits than varieties with higher costs. However, lower cost varieties do not pass on
all of the cost differential to consumers in the form of lower prices: they also have higher markups
(in both absolute and relative terms) than varieties with higher costs.8
Firms with core competency v > vD cannot profitably produce their core variety and exit.
Hence, cD = vD is also the cutoff for firm survival and measures the ‘toughness’ of competition in
the market: it is a sufficient statistic for all performance measures across varieties and firms.9 We
assume that cM is high enough that it is always above cD, so exit rates are always positive. All
firms with core cost c < cD earn positive profits (gross of the entry cost) on their core varieties
and remain in the industry. Some firms will also earn positive profits from the introduction of
additional varieties. In particular, firms with cost c such that v(m, c) ≤ vD ⇐⇒ c ≤ ωmcD earn
positive profits on their m-th additional variety and thus produce at least m + 1 varieties. The
total number of varieties produced by a firm with cost c is
M(c) =
 0 if c > cD,max {m | c ≤ ωmcD}+ 1 if c ≤ cD. (8)
which is (weakly) decreasing for all c ∈ [0, cM ]. Accordingly, the number of varieties produced by a
7Given the absence of cannibalization motive, these variety level performance measures are identical to the single
product case studied in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This tractability allows us to analytically solve the closed and
open equilibria with heterogenous firms (and asymmetric countries in the open economy).
8De Loecker et al. (2012) find empirical support for these properties, both across and within firms, in the case of
Indian multi-product firms.
9We will see shortly how the average price of all varieties and the number of varieties is uniquely pinned-down by
this cutoff.
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firm with cost c is indeed an integer number (and not a mass with positive measure). This number
is an increasing step function of the firm’s productivity 1/c, as depicted in Figure 1 below. Firms
with higher core productivity thus produce (weakly) more varieties.
c−1
M c 
cD
−1 cD
−1 2cD
−1 3cD
−1
1
2
3
4
Figure 1: Number of Varieties Produced as a Function of Firm Productivity
Given a mass of entrants NE , the distribution of costs across all varieties is determined by the
optimal firm product range choice M(c) as well as the distribution of core competencies G(c). Let
Mv(v) denote the measure function for varieties (the measure of varieties produced at cost v or
lower, given NE entrants). Further define H(v) ≡Mv(v)/NE as the normalized measure of varieties
per unit mass of entrants. Then H(v) =
∑∞
m=0G(ω
mv) and is exogenously determined from G(.)
and ω. Given a unit mass of entrants, there will be a mass G(v) of varieties with cost v or less; a
mass G(ωv) of first additional varieties (with cost v or less); a mass G(ω2v) of second additional
varieties; and so forth. The measure H(v) sums over all these varieties.
2.3 Free Entry and Equilibrium
Prior to entry, the expected firm profit is
∫ cD
0 Π(c)dG(c)− fE where
Π(c) ≡
M(c)−1∑
m=0
pi (v (m, c)) (9)
9
denotes the profit of a firm with cost c. If this profit were negative for all c’s, no firms would
enter the industry. As long as some firms produce, the expected profit is driven to zero by the
unrestricted entry of new firms. This yields the equilibrium free entry condition:
∫ cD
0
Π(c)dG(c) =
∫ cD
0
 ∑
{m|ω−mc≤cD}
pi
(
ω−mc
) dG(c) (10)
=
∞∑
m=0
[∫ ωmcD
0
pi
(
ω−mc
)
dG(c)
]
= fE ,
where the second equality first averages over the mth produced variety by all firms, then sums over
m.
The free entry condition (10) determines the cost cutoff cD = vD. This cutoff, in turn, deter-
mines the aggregate mass of varieties, since vD = p(vD) must also be equal to the zero demand
price threshold in (4):
vD =
1
ηM + γ
(γα+ ηMp¯) .
The aggregate mass of varieties is then
M =
2γ
η
α− vD
vD − v ,
where the average cost of all varieties
v =
1
M
vD∫
0
vdMv(v) =
1
NEH(vD)
vD∫
0
vNEdH(v) =
1
H(vD)
vD∫
0
vdH(v)
depends only on vD.
10 Similarly, this cutoff also uniquely pins down the average price across all
varieties:
p¯ =
1
M
vD∫
0
p(v)dMv(v) =
1
H(vD)
vD∫
0
p(v)dH(v).
Finally, the mass of entrants is given by NE = M/H(vD), which can in turn be used to obtain the
mass of producing firms N = NEG(cD).
10We also use the relationship between average cost and price v¯ = 2p¯− vD, which is obtained from (7).
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2.4 Parametrization of Technology
All the results derived so far hold for any distribution of core cost draws G(c). However, in order
to simplify some of the ensuing analysis, we use a specific parametrization for this distribution.
In particular, we assume that core productivity draws 1/c follow a Pareto distribution with lower
productivity bound 1/cM and shape parameter k ≥ 1. This implies a distribution of cost draws c
given by
G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
, c ∈ [0, cM ]. (11)
The shape parameter k indexes the dispersion of cost draws. When k = 1, the cost distribution is
uniform on [0, cM ]. As k increases, the relative number of high cost firms increases, and the cost
distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels. As k goes to infinity, the distribution
becomes degenerate at cM . Any truncation of the cost distribution from above will retain the same
distribution function and shape parameter k. The productivity distribution of surviving firms
will therefore also be Pareto with shape k, and the truncated cost distribution will be given by
GD(c) = (c/cD)
k , c ∈ [0, cD].
When core competencies are distributed Pareto, then all produced varieties will share the same
Pareto distribution:
H(c) =
∞∑
m=0
G(ωmc) = ΩG(c), (12)
where Ω =
(
1− ωk)−1 > 1 is an index of multi-product flexibility (which varies monotonically with
ω). In equilibrium, this index will also be equal to the average number of products produced across
all surviving firms:
M
N
=
H(vD)NE
G(cD)NE
= Ω.
The Pareto parametrization also yields a simple closed-form solution for the cost cutoff cD from
the free entry condition (10):
cD =
[
γφ
LΩ
] 1
k+2
, (13)
where φ ≡ 2(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )k fE is a technology index that combines the effects of bet-
ter distribution of cost draws (lower cM ) and lower entry costs fE . We assume that cM >√
[2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE ] / (LΩ) in order to ensure cD < cM as was previously anticipated. We
also note that, as the customization cost for non-core varieties becomes infinitely large (ω → 0),
multi-product flexibility Ω goes to 1, and (13) then boils down to the single-product case studied
11
by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
2.5 Equilibrium with Multi-Product Firms
Equation (13) summarizes how technology (referenced by the distribution of cost draws and the sunk
entry cost), market size, product differentiation, and multi-product flexibility affect the toughness
of competition in the market equilibrium. Increases in market size, technology improvements (a fall
in cM or fE), and increases in product substitutability (a rise in γ) all lead to tougher competition
in the market and thus to an equilibrium with a lower cost cutoff cD. As multi-product flexibility
Ω increases, firms respond by introducing more products. This additional production is skewed
towards the better performing firms and also leads to tougher competition and a lower cD cutoff.
A market with tougher competition (lower cD) also features more product variety M and a lower
average price p¯ (due to the combined effect of product selection towards lower cost varieties and of
lower markups). Both of these contribute to higher welfare U . Given our Pareto parametrization,
we can write all of these variables as simple closed form functions of the cost cutoff cD:
M =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− cD
cD
, p¯ =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cD, U = 1 +
1
2η
(α− cD)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2
cD
)
. (14)
Increases in the toughness of competition do not affect the average number of varieties produced
per firm M/N = Ω because the mass of surviving firms N rises by the same proportion as the mass
of produced varieties M .11 However, each firm responds to tougher competition by dropping its
worst performing varieties (highest m) and reducing the number of varieties produced M(c).12 The
selection of firms with respect to exit explains how the average number of products produced per
firm can remain constant: exiting firms are those with the highest cost c who produce the fewest
number of products.
3 Competition, Product Mix, and Productivity
We now investigate the link between toughness of competition and productivity at both the firm
and aggregate level. We just described how tougher competition affects the selection of both firms
11This exact offsetting effect between the number of firms and the number of products is driven by our functional
form assumptions. However, the downward shift in M(c) in response to competition (described next) holds for a
much more general set of parameterizations.
12To be precise, the number of produced varieties M(c) weakly decreases: if the change in the cutoff cD is small
enough, then some firms may still produce the same number of varieties. For other firms with high cost c, M(c) drops
to zero which implies firm exit.
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in a market, and of the products they produce: high cost firms exit, and firms drop their high
cost products. These selection effects induce productivity improvements at both the firm and the
aggregate level.13
However, our model features an important additional channel that links tougher competition to
higher firm and aggregate productivity. This new channel operates through the effect of competition
on a firm’s product mix. Tougher competition induces multi-product firms to skew production
towards their better performing varieties (closer to their core competency). Thus, holding a multi-
product firm’s product range fixed, an increase in competition leads to an increase in that firm’s
productivity. Aggregating across firms, this product mix response also generates an aggregate
productivity gain from tougher competition, over and above the effects from firm and product
selection.
We have not yet defined how firm and aggregate productivity are measured. We start with the
aggregation of output, revenue, and cost (employment) at the firm level. For any firm c, this is
simply the sum of output, revenue, and cost over all varieties produced:
Q(c) ≡
M(c)−1∑
m=0
q (v (m, c)) , R(c) ≡
M(c)−1∑
m=0
r (v (m, c)) , C(c) ≡
M(c)−1∑
m=0
v (m, c) q (v (m, c)) . (15)
One measure of firm productivity is simply output per worker Φ(c) ≡ Q(c)/C(c). This produc-
tivity measure does not have a clear empirical counterpart for multi-product firms, as output units
for each product are normalized so that one unit of each product generates the same utility for the
consumer (this is the implicit normalization behind the product symmetry in the utility function).
A firm’s deflated sales per worker ΦR(c) ≡
[
R(c)/P¯
]
/C(c) provides another productivity measure
that has a clear empirical counterpart. For this productivity measure, we need to define the price
deflator P¯ . We choose
P¯ ≡
∫ cD
0 R(c)dG(c)∫ cD
0 Q(c)dG(c)
=
k + 1
k + 2
cD.
This is the average of all the variety prices p(v) weighted by their output share. We could also
have used the unweighted price average p¯ that we previously defined, or an average weighted by a
variety’s revenue share (i.e. its market share) instead of output share. In our model, all of these
price averages only differ by a multiplicative constant, so the effects of competition (changes in
13This effect of product scope on firm productivity is emphasized by Bernard et al (2011) and Eckel and Neary
(2010).
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the cutoff cD) on productivity will not depend on this choice of price averages.
14 We define the
aggregate counterparts to our two firm productivity measures as industry output per worker and
industry deflated sales per worker:
Φ¯ ≡
∫ cD
0 Q(c)dG(c)∫ cD
0 C(c)dG(c)
, Φ¯R =
[∫ cD
0 R(c)dG(c)
]
/P¯∫ cD
0 C(c)dG(c)
.
Our choice of the price deflator P¯ then implies that these two aggregate productivity measures
coincide:15
Φ¯ = Φ¯R =
k + 2
k
1
cD
. (16)
Equation (16) summarizes the overall effect of tougher competition on aggregate productivity
gains. This aggregate response of productivity combines the effects of competition on both firm
productivity and inter-firm reallocations (including entry and exit). We now detail how tougher
competition induces improvements in firm productivity through its impact on a firm’s product
mix. In appendix B, we show that both firm productivity measures, Φ(c) and ΦR(c), increase for
all multi-product firms when competition increases (cD decreases). The key component of this
proof is that, holding a firm’s product scope constant (a given number M > 1 of non-core varieties
produced), firm productivity over that product scope (output or deflated sales of those M products
per worker producing those products) increases whenever competition increases. This effect of
competition on firm productivity, by construction, is entirely driven by the response of the firm’s
product mix.
To isolate this product mix response to competition, consider two varieties m and m′ produced
by a firm with cost c. Assume that m < m′ so that variety m is closer to the core. The ratio of
the firm’s output of the two varieties is given by
q(v (m, c))
q(v (m′, c))
=
cD − ω−mc
cD − ω−m′c .
As competition increases (cD decreases), this ratio increases, implying that the firm skews its
production towards its core varieties. This happens because the increased competition increases
the price elasticity of demand for all products. At a constant relative price p(v(m, c))/p(v(m′, c)),
the higher price elasticity translates into higher relative demand q(v(m, c))/q(v(m′, c)) and sales
14As we previously reported in equation (14), the unweighted price average is p¯ = [(2k + 1) / (2k + 2)]cD; and the
average weighted by market share is [(6k + 2k2 + 3)/(2k2 + 8k + 6)]cD.
15If we had picked one of the other price averages, the two aggregate productivity measures would differ by a
multiplicative constant.
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r(v(m, c))/r(v(m′, c)) for good m (relative to m′).16 In our specific demand parametrization, there
is a further increase in relative demand and sales, because markups drop more for good m than
m′, which implies that the relative price p(v(m, c))/p(v(m′, c)) decreases.17 It is this reallocation
of output towards better performing products (also mirrored by a reallocation of production labor
towards those products) that generates the productivity increases within the firm. In other words,
tougher competition skews the distribution of employment, output, and sales towards the better
performing varieties (closer to the core), while it flattens the firm’s distribution of prices.
In the open economy version of our model that we develop in the next section, we show how
firms respond to tougher competition in export markets in very similar ways by skewing their
exported product mix towards their better performing products. Our empirical results confirm a
strong effect of such a link between competition and product mix.
4 Open Economy
We now turn to the open economy in order to examine how market size and geography determine
differences in the toughness of competition across markets – and how the latter translates into
differences in the exporters’ product mix. We allow for an arbitrary number of countries and
asymmetric trade costs. Let J denote the number of countries, indexed by l = 1, ..., J . The
markets are segmented, although any produced variety can be exported from country l to country
h subject to an iceberg trade cost τlh > 1. Thus, the delivered cost for variety m exported to
country h by a firm with core competency c in country l is τlhv(m, c) = τlhω
−mc.
4.1 Equilibrium with Asymmetric Countries
Let pmaxl denote the price threshold for positive demand in market l. Then (4) implies
pmaxl =
1
ηMl + γ
(γα+ ηMlp¯l) , (17)
where Ml is the total number of products selling in country l (the total number of domestic and
exported varieties) and p¯l is their average price. Let pill(v) and pilh(v) represent the maximized
value of profits from domestic and export sales to country h for a variety with cost v produced in
country l. (We use the subscript ll to denote “domestic” variables, pertaining to firms located in
16For the result on relative sales, we are assuming that the price elasticity of demand (ε) is larger than one.
17Good m closer to the core initially has a higher markup than good m′; see (7) .
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l.) The cost cutoffs for profitable domestic production and for profitable exports must satisfy:
vll = sup {c : pill(v) > 0} = pmaxl ,
vlh = sup {c : pilh(v) > 0} = p
max
h
τlh
,
(18)
and thus vlh = vhh/τlh. As was the case in the closed economy, the cutoff vll, l = 1, ..., J , summarizes
all the effects of market conditions in country l relevant for all firm performance measures. The
profit functions can then be written as a function of these cutoffs (assuming that markets are
segmented, as in Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008):
pill(v) =
Ll
4γ
(vll − v)2 ,
pilh(v) =
Lh
4γ
τ2lh (vlh − v)2 =
Lh
4γ
(vhh − τlhv)2 .
(19)
As in the closed economy, cll = vll will be the cutoff for firm survival in country l (cutoff for
domestic sales of firms producing in l). Similarly, clh = vlh will be the firm export cutoff from l to h
(no firm with c > clh can profitably export any varieties from l to h). A firm with core competency
c will produce all varieties m such that pill (v(m, c)) ≥ 0; it will export to h the subset of varieties
m such that pilh (v(m, c)) ≥ 0. The total number of varieties produced and exported to h by a firm
with cost c in country l are thus
Mll(c) =
 0 if c > cll,max {m | c ≤ ωmcll}+ 1 if c ≤ cll,
Mlh(c) =
 0 if c > clh,max {m | c ≤ ωmclh}+ 1 if c ≤ clh.
We can then define a firm’s total domestic and export profits by aggregating over these varieties:
Πll(c) =
Mll(c)−1∑
m=0
pill (v (m, c)) , Πlh(c) =
Mlh(c)−1∑
m=0
pilh (v (m, c)) .
Entry is unrestricted in all countries. Firms choose a production location prior to entry and paying
the sunk entry cost. We assume that the entry cost fE and cost distribution G(c) are common
across countries (although this can be relaxed).18 We maintain our Pareto parametrization (11)
18Differences in the support for this distribution could also be introduced as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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for this distribution. A prospective entrant’s expected profits will then be given by
∫ cll
0
Πll(c)dG(c) +
∑
h6=l
∫ clh
0
Πlh(c)dG(c)
=
∞∑
m=0
[∫ ωmcll
0
pill
(
ω−mc
)
dG(c)
]
+
∑
h6=l
∞∑
m=0
[∫ ωmclh
0
pilh
(
ω−mc
)
dG(c)
]
=
1
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ckM
LlΩck+2ll +∑
h6=l
LhΩτ
2
lhc
k+2
lh

=
Ω
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ckM
Llck+2ll +∑
h6=l
Lhτ
−k
lh c
k+2
hh
 .
Setting the expected profit equal to the entry cost yields the free entry conditions:
J∑
h=1
ρlhLhc
k+2
hh =
γφ
Ω
l = 1, ..., J. (20)
where ρlh ≡ τ−klh < 1 is a measure of ‘freeness’ of trade from country l to country h that varies
inversely with the trade costs τlh. The technology index φ is the same as in the closed economy
case.
The free entry conditions (20) yield a system of J equations that can be solved for the J
equilibrium domestic cutoffs using Cramer’s rule:
chh =
(
γφ
Ω
∑J
l=1 |Clh|
|P|
1
Lh
) 1
k+2
, (21)
where |P| is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix
P ≡

1 ρ12 · · · ρ1M
ρ21 1 · · · ρ2M
...
...
. . .
...
ρM1 ρM2 · · · 1
 ,
and |Clh| is the cofactor of its ρlh element. Cross-country differences in cutoffs now arise from two
sources: own country size (Lh) and geographical remoteness, captured by
∑J
l=1 |Clh| / |P|. Central
countries benefiting from a large local market have lower cutoffs, and exhibit tougher competition
than peripheral countries with a small local market.
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As in the closed economy, the threshold price condition in country h (17), along with the
resulting Pareto distribution of all prices for varieties sold in h (domestic prices and export prices
have an identical distribution in country h) yield a zero-cutoff profit condition linking the variety
cutoff vhh = chh to the mass of varieties sold in country h :
Mh =
2 (k + 1) γ
η
α− chh
chh
. (22)
Given a positive mass of entrants NE,l in country l, there will be G(clh)NE,l firms exporting
ΩρlhG(clh)NE,l varieties to country h. Summing over all these varieties (including those produced
and sold in h) yields19
J∑
l=1
ρlhNE,l =
Mh
Ωckhh
.
The latter provides a system of J linear equations that can be solved for the number of entrants in
the J countries using Cramer’s rule:20
NE,l =
φγ
Ωη (k + 2) fE
J∑
h=1
(α− chh)
ck+1hh
|Clh|
|P| . (23)
As in the closed economy, the cutoff level completely summarizes the distribution of prices as well
as all the other performance measures. Hence, the cutoff in each country also uniquely determines
welfare in that country. The relationship between welfare and the cutoff is the same as in the closed
economy (see (14)).
4.2 Bilateral Trade Patterns with Firm and Product Selection
We have now completely characterized the multi-country open economy equilibrium. Selection
operates at many different margins: a subset of firms survive in each country, and a smaller subset
of those export to any given destination. Within a firm, there is an endogenous selection of its
product range (the range of product produced); those products are all sold on the firm’s domestic
market, but only a subset of those products are sold in each export market. In order to keep our
multi-country open economy model as tractable as possible, we have assumed a single bilateral trade
cost τlh that does not vary across firms or products. This simplification implies some predictions
regarding the ordering of the selection process across countries and products that is overly rigid.
19Recall that chh = τlhclh.
20We use the properties that relate the freeness matrix P and its transpose in terms of determinants and cofactors.
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Since τlh does not vary across firms in l contemplating exports to h, then all those firms would
face the same ranking of export market destinations based on the toughness of competition in
that market, chh, and the trade cost to that market τlh. All exporters would then export to the
country with the highest chh/τlh, and then move down the country destination list in decreasing
order of this ratio until exports to the next destination were no longer profitable. This generates
a “pecking order” of export destinations for exporters from a given country l. Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2011) show that there is such a stable ranking of export destinations for French
exporters. Needless to say, the empirical prediction for the ordered set of export destinations is
not strictly adhered to by every French exporter (some export to a given destination without also
exporting to all the other higher ranked destinations). Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz formally show
how some idiosyncratic noise in the bilateral trading cost can explain those departures from the
dominant ranking of export destinations. They also show that the empirical regularities for the
ranking of export destinations are so strong that one can easily reject the notion of independent
export destination choices by firms.
Our model features a similar rigid ordering within a firm regarding the products exported across
destinations. Without any variation in the bilateral trade cost τlh across products, an exporter from
l would always exactly follow its domestic core competency ladder when determining the range of
products exported across destinations: an exporter would never export variety m′ > m unless it
also exported variety m to any given destination. Just as we described for the prediction of country
rankings, we clearly do not expect the empirical prediction for product rankings to hold exactly
for all firms. Nevertheless, a similar empirical pattern emerges highlighting a stable ranking of
products for each exporter across export destinations.21 We empirically describe the substantial
extent of this ranking stability for French exporters in our next section.
Putting together all the different margins of trade, we can use our model to generate predictions
for aggregate bilateral trade. An exporter in country l with core competency c generates export
sales of variety m to country h equal to (assuming that this variety is exported):
rlh(v(m, c)) =
Lh
4γ
[
v2hh − (τlhv(m, c))2
]
. (24)
21Bernard et al (2011) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) report that there is such a stable ordering of a firm’s
product line for U.S. and Brazilian firms.
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Aggregate bilateral trade from l to h is then:
EXPlh = NE,lΩρ
lh
∫ clh
0
rlh(v(m, c))dG(v)
=
Ω
2γ (k + 2) ckM
·NE,l · ck+2hh Lh · ρlh. (25)
Thus, aggregate bilateral trade follows a standard gravity specification based on country fixed
effects (separate fixed effects for the exporter and importer) and a bilateral term that captures the
effects of all bilateral barriers/enhancers to trade.22
5 Exporters’ Product Mix Across Destinations
We previously described how, in the closed economy, firms respond to increases in competition in
their market by skewing their product mix towards their core products. We also analyzed how this
product mix response generated increases in firm productivity. We now show how differences in
competition across export market destinations induce exporters to those markets to respond in very
similar ways: when exporting to markets with tougher competition, exporters skew their product
level exports towards their core products. We proceed in a similar way as we did for the closed
economy by examining a given firm’s ratio of exports of two products m′ and m, where m is closer
to the core. In anticipation of our empirical work, we write the ratio of export sales (revenue not
output), but the ratio of export quantities responds to competition in identical ways. Using (24),
we can write this sales ratio:
rlh(v (m, c))
rlh(v (m′, c))
=
c2hh − (τlhω−mc)2
c2hh − (τlhω−m′c)2
. (26)
Tougher competition in an export market (lower chh) increases this ratio, which captures how
firms skew their exports toward their core varieties (recall that m′ > m so variety m is closer to
the core). The intuition behind this result is very similar to the one we described for the closed
economy. Tougher competition in a market increases the price elasticity of demand for all goods
exported to that market. As in the closed economy, this skews relative demand and relative export
sales towards the goods closer to the core. In our empirical work, we focus on measuring this effect
22This type of structural gravity specification with country fixed-effects is generated by a large set of different
modeling frameworks. See Feenstra (2004) for further discussion of this topic. In (25), we do not further substitute
out the endogenous number of entrants and cost cutoff based on (21) and (23). This would lead to just a different
functional form for the country fixed effects.
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of tougher competition across export market destinations on a firm’s exported product mix.
We could also use (26) to make predictions regarding the impact of the bilateral trade cost τlh
on a firm’s exported product mix: Higher trade costs raise the firm’s delivered cost and lead to a
higher export ratio. The higher delivered cost increase the competition faced by an exporting firm,
as it then competes against domestic firms that benefit from a greater cost advantage. However,
this comparative static is very sensitive to the specification for the trade cost across a firm’s product
ladder. If trade barriers induce disproportionately higher trade costs on products further away from
the core, then the direction of this comparative static would be reversed. Furthermore, identifying
the independent effect of trade barriers on the exporters’ product mix would also require micro-level
data for exporters located in many different countries (to generate variation across both origin and
destination of export sales). Our data ‘only’ covers the export patterns for French exporters, and
does not give us this variation in origin country. For these reasons, we do not emphasize the effect
of trade barriers on the product mix of exporters. In our empirical work, we will only seek to
control for a potential correlation between bilateral trade barriers with respect to France and the
level of competition in destination countries served by French exporters.23
As was the case for the closed economy, the skewing of a firm’s product mix towards core
varieties also entails increases in firm productivity. Empirically, we cannot separately measure
a firm’s productivity with respect to its production for each export market. However, we can
theoretically define such a productivity measure in an analogous way to Φ(c) ≡ Q(c)/C(c) for the
closed economy. We thus define the productivity of firm c in l for its exports to destination h as
Φlh(c) ≡ Qlh(c)/Clh(c), where Qlh(c) are the total units of output that firm c exports to h, and
Clh(c) are the total labor costs incurred by firm c to produce those units.
24 In appendix B, we show
that this export market-specific productivity measure (as well as the associated measure ΦR,lh(c)
based on deflated sales) increases with the toughness of competition in that export market. In other
words, Φlh(c) and ΦR,lh(c) both increase when chh decreases. Thus, changes in exported product
mix also have important repercussions for firm productivity.
23The theoretical implications of trade liberalization of our model are discussed in appendix A.
24In order for this productivity measure to aggregate up to overall country productivity, we incorporate the pro-
ductivity of the transportation/trade cost sector into this productivity measure. This implies that firm c employs the
labor units that are used to produce the “melted” units of output that cover the trade cost; those labor units are thus
included in Clh(c). The output of firm c is measured as valued-added, which implies that those “melted” units are
not included in Qlh(c) (the latter are the number of units produced by firm c that are consumed in h). Separating out
the productivity of the transportation sector would not affect our main comparative static with respect to toughness
of competition in the export market.
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6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Skewness of Exported Product Mix
We now test the main prediction of our model regarding the impact of competition across export
market destinations on a firm’s exported product mix. Our model predicts that tougher compe-
tition in an export market will induce firms to lower markups on all their exported products and
therefore skew their export sales towards their best performing products. We thus need data on a
firm’s exports across products and destinations. We use comprehensive firm-level data on annual
shipments by all French exporters to all countries in the world for a set of more than 10,000 goods.
Firm-level exports are collected by French customs and include export sales for each 8-digit (com-
bined nomenclature) product by destination country.25 Since we are interested in the cross-section
of firm-product exports across destinations, we restrict our sample to a single year, for 2003 (this
is the last year of our available data; results obtained from other years are very similar). The
reporting criteria for all firms operating in the French metropolitan territory are as follows: For
within EU exports, the firm’s annual trade value exceeds 100,000 Euros;26 and for exports outside
the EU, the exported value to a destination exceeds 1,000 Euros or a weight of a ton. Despite
these limitations, the database is nearly comprehensive. In 2003, 100,033 firms report exports
across 229 destination countries (or territories) for 10,072 products. This represents data on over
2 million shipments. We restrict our analysis to export data in manufacturing industries, mostly
eliminating firms in the service and wholesale/distribution sector to ensure that firms take part in
the production of the goods they export.27 This leaves us with data on over a million shipments
by firms in the whole range of manufacturing sectors. We also drop observations for firms that
the French national statistical institute reports as having an affiliate abroad. This avoids the issue
that multinational firms may substitute exports of some of their best performing products with
affiliate production in the destination country (following the export versus FDI trade-off described
in Helpman et al (2004)). We therefore limit our analysis to firms that do not have this possibility,
in order to reduce noise in the product export rankings.
In order to measure the skewness of a firm’s exported product mix across destinations, we first
need to make some assumptions regarding the empirical measurement of a firm’s product ladder.
25We thank the French customs administration for making this data available to researchers at CEPII.
26If that threshold is not met, firms can choose to report under a simplified scheme without supplying export des-
tinations. However, in practice, many firms under that threshold report the detailed export destination information.
27Some large distributors such as Carrefour account for a disproportionate number of annual shipments.
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We start with the most direct counterpart to our theoretical model, which assumes that the firm’s
product ladder does not vary across destinations. For this measure, we rank all the products
exported by a firm according to the value of exports to the world, and use this ranking as an
indicator for the product rank m.28 We call this the firm’s global product rank. An alternative
is to measure a firm’s product rank for each destination based on the firm’s exports sales to that
destination. We call this the firm’s local product rank. Empirically, this local product ranking can
vary across destinations. However, as we alluded to earlier, this local product ranking is remarkably
stable across destinations.
The Spearman rank correlation between a firm’s local and global rankings (in each export
market destination) is .68.29 Naturally, this correlation might be partly driven by firms that export
only one product to one market, for which the global rank has to be equal to the local rank. In
Table 1, we therefore report the rank correlation as we gradually restrict the sample to firms that
export many products to many markets. The bottom line is that this correlation remains quite
stable: for firms exporting more than 50 products to more than 50 destinations, the correlation is
still .58. Another possibility is that this correlation is different across destination income levels.
Restricting the sample to the top 50 or 20% richest importers hardly changes this correlation (.69
and .71 respectively).30
Table 1: Spearman Correlations Between Global and Local Rankings
Firms exporting at least: # products
to # countries 1 2 5 10 50
1 67.93% 67.78% 67.27% 66.26% 59.39%
2 67.82% 67.74% 67.28% 66.28% 59.39%
5 67.55% 67.51% 67.2% 66.3% 59.43%
10 67.02% 67% 66.82% 66.12% 59.46%
50 61.66% 61.66% 61.64% 61.53% 58.05%
Although high, this correlation still highlights substantial departures from a steady global prod-
uct ladder. A natural alternative is therefore to use the local product rank when measuring the
skewness of a firm’s exported product mix. In this interpretation, the identity of the core (or other
rank number) product can change across destinations. We thus use both the firm’s global and local
28We experimented ranking products for each firm based on the number of export destinations; and obtained very
similar results to the ranking based on global export sales.
29Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) also report a huge amount of stability in the local rankings across destinations.
The Spearman rank coefficient they report is .837. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) report a rank correlation of .76
between home and export sales of Mexican firms.
30We nevertheless separately report our regression results for those restricted sample of countries based on income.
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product rank to construct the firm’s destination-specific export sales ratio rlh(v(m, c))/rlh(v(m
′, c))
for m < m′. Since many firms export few products to many destinations, increasing the higher prod-
uct rank m′ disproportionately reduces the number of available firm/destination observations. For
most of our analysis, we pick m = 0 (core product) and m′ = 1, but also report results for m′ = 2.31
Thus, we construct the ratio of a firm’s export sales to every destination for its best performing
product (either globally, or in each destination) relative to its next best performing product (again,
either globally, or in each destination). The local ratios can be computed so long as a firm exports
at least two products to a destination (or three when m′ = 2). The global ratios can be computed
so long as a firm exports its top (in terms of world exports) two products to a destination. We
thus obtain these measures that are firm c and destination h specific, so long as those criteria are
met (there is no variation in origin l = France). We use those ratios in logs, so that they represent
percentage differences in export sales. We refer to the ratios as either local or global, based on
the ranking method used to compute them. Lastly, we also constrain the sample so that the two
products considered belong to the same 2-digit product category (there are 97 such categories).
This eliminates ratios based on products that are in completely different sectors; however, this
restriction hardly impacts our reported results.
We construct a third set of measures that seeks to capture changes in skewness of a firm’s
exported product mix over the entire range of exported products (instead of being confined to the
top two or three products). We use several different skewness statistics for the distribution of firm
export sales to a destination: the standard deviation of log export sales, a Herfindhal index, and
a Theil index (a measure of entropy). Since these statistics are independent of the identity of the
products exported to a destination, they are “local” by nature, and do not have any global ranking
counterpart. These statistics can be computed for every firm-destination combination where the
firm exports two or more products.
6.2 Toughness of Competition Across Destinations and Bilateral Controls
Our theoretical model predicts that the toughness of competition in a destination is determined
by that destination’s size, and by its geography (proximity to other big countries). We control
for country size using GDP expressed in a common currency at market exchange rates. We now
seek a control for the geography of a destination that does not rely on country-level data for that
destination. We use the supply potential concept introduced by Redding and Venables (2004) as
31We also obtain very similar results for m = 1 and m′ = 2.
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such a control. In words, the supply potential is the aggregate predicted exports to a destination
based on a bilateral trade gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer fixed effects
and the standard bilateral measures of trade barriers/enhancers. We construct a related measure of
a destination’s foreign supply potential that does not use the importer’s fixed effect when predicting
aggregate exports to that destination. By construction, foreign supply potential is thus uncorrelated
with the importer’s fixed-effect. It is closely related to the construction of a country’s market
potential (which seeks to capture a measure of predicted import demand for a country). The
construction of the supply potential measures is discussed in greater detail in Redding and Venables
(2004); we use the foreign supply measure for the year 2003 from Head and Mayer (2011) who extend
the analysis to many more countries and more years of data.32 Since we only work with the foreign
supply potential measure, we drop the qualifier ‘foreign’ when we subsequently refer to this variable.
As a robustness check, we also use the number of French exporters to a destination as a measure of
competition for French firms in that market; this measure combines the effects of both destination
size and geography (those robustness results are reported in appendix D).
We also use a set of controls for bilateral trade barriers/enhancers (τ in our model) between
France and the destination country: distance, contiguity, colonial links, common-language, and
dummies for membership of Regional Trading Agreements, GATT/WTO, and a common currency
area (the eurozone in this case).33
6.3 Results
Before reporting the regression results of the skewness measures on the destination country mea-
sures, we first show some scatter plots for the global ratio against both destination country GDP
and our measure of supply potential. These are displayed in Figures 2 and 3. For each destination,
we use the mean global ratio across exporting firms. Since the firm-level measure is very noisy, the
precision of the mean increases with the number of available firm data points (for each destination).
We first show the scatter plots using all available destinations, with symbol weights proportional
to the number of available firm observations, and then again dropping any destination with fewer
than 250 exporting firms.34 Those scatter plots show a very strong positive correlation between the
32As is the case with market potential, a country’s supplier potential is strongly correlated with that country’s
GDP: big trading economies tend to be located near one-another. The supply potential data is available online at
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm
33All those variables are available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm
34Increasing that threshold level for the number of exporters slightly increases the fit and slope of the regression
line through the scatter plot.
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export share ratios and the measures of toughness of competition in the destination. Absent any
variation in the toughness of competition across destinations – such as in a world with monopolistic
competition and C.E.S. preferences where markups are exogenously fixed – the variation in the rel-
ative export shares should be white noise. The data clearly show that variations in competition (at
least as proxied by country size and supplier potential) are strong enough to induce large variations
in the firms’ relative export sales across destinations. Scatter plots for the local ratio and Theil
index look very similar.
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Figure 2: Mean Global Ratio and Destination Country GDP in 2003
We now turn to our regression analysis using the three skewness measures. Each observation
summarizes the skewness of export sales for a given firm to a given destination. Since we seek to
uncover variation in that skewness for a given firm, we include firm fixed effects throughout. Our
remaining independent variables are destination specific: our two measures of competition (GDP
and supplier potential, both in logs) as well as any bilateral measures of trade barriers/enhancers
since there is no variation in country origin (we discuss how we specify those bilateral controls in
further detail in the next paragraph). There are undoubtedly other unobserved characteristics of
countries that affect our dependent skewness variables. These unobserved country characteristics
are common to firms exporting to that destination and hence generate a correlated error-term
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Figure 3: Mean Global Ratio and Destination Supply Potential in 2003
structure, potentially biasing downwards the standard error of our variables of interest. The stan-
dard clustering procedure does not apply well here for two reasons: 1) the level of clustering is not
nested within the level of fixed effects, and 2) the number of clusters is quite small with respect to
the size of each cluster. Harrigan and Deng (2008) encounter a similar problem and use the solu-
tion proposed by Wooldridge (2006), who recommends to run country-specific random effects on
firm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. This procedure allows to account
for firm fixed effects, as well as country-level correlation patterns in the error term. We follow this
estimation strategy here and apply it to all of the reported results below.35
Our first set of results regresses our two main skewness measures (log export ratio of best to
next best product for global and local product rankings) on destination GDP and foreign supply
potential. The coefficients, reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2, show a very significant impact
of both country size and geography on the skewness of a firm’s export sales to that destination (we
35We have experimented with several other estimation procedures to control for the correlated error structure:
firm-level fixed effects with/without country clustering and demeaned data run with simple OLS. Those procedures
highlight that it is important to account for the country-level error-term correlation. This affects the significance of
the supply potential variable (as we highlight with our preferred estimation procedure). However, the p-values for the
GDP variable are always substantially lower, and none of those procedures come close to overturning the significance
of that variable.
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discuss the economic magnitude in further detail below). This initial specification does not control
for any independent effect of bilateral trade barriers on the skewness of a firm’s exported product
mix. Here, we suffer from the limitation inherent in our data that we do not observe any variation in
the country of origin for all the export flows. This makes it difficult to separately identify the effects
of those bilateral trade barriers from the destination’s supply potential. France is located very near
to the center of the biggest regional trading group in the world. Thus, distance from France is
highly correlated with “good” geography and hence a high supply potential for that destination:
the correlation between log distance and log supply potential is 78%. Therefore, when we introduce
all the controls for bilateral trade barriers to our specification, it is not surprising that there is too
much co-linearity with the destination’s supply potential to separately identify the independent
effect of the latter.36 These results are reported in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2. Although
the coefficient for supply potential is no longer significant due to this co-linearity problem, the
effect of country size on the skewness of export sales remain highly significant. Other than country
size, the only other variable that is significant (at 5% or below) is the effect of a common currency:
export sales to countries in the Eurozone display vastly higher skewness. However, we must exercise
caution when interpreting this effect. Due to the lack of variation in origin country, we cannot say
whether this captures the effect of a common currency between the destination and France, or
whether this is an independent effect of the Euro.37
Although we do not have firm-product-destination data for countries other than France, bilateral
aggregate data is available for the full matrix of origins-destinations in the world. Our theoretical
model predicts a bilateral gravity relationship (25) that can be exploited to recover the combined
effect of bilateral trade barriers as a single parameter (τlh in our model). The only property of our
gravity relationship that we exploit is that bilateral trade can be decomposed into exporter and
importer fixed effects, and a bilateral component that captures the joint effect of trade barriers.38
We use the same bilateral gravity specification that we previously used to construct supply potential
(again, in logs). We purge bilateral flows from both origin and destination fixed effects, to keep
only the contribution of bilateral barriers to trade. This gives us an estimate for the bilateral log
36As we mentioned, distance by itself introduces a huge amount of co-linearity with supply potential. The other
bilateral trade controls then further exacerbate this problem (membership in the EU is also strongly correlated with
“good” geography and hence supply potential).
37If this is a destination Euro effect, then this would fit well with our theoretical prediction for the effect of tougher
competition in Euro markets on the skewness of export sales.
38This property of gravity equations is not specific to our model. It can be generated by a very large class of
models. Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Head and Mayer (2011) discuss all the different models that lead to a similar
gravity decomposition.
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freeness of trade between all country pairs (ln ρlh).
39 We use the subset of this predicted data where
France is the exporting country. Looking across destinations, this freeness of trade variable is still
highly correlated with distance from France (the correlation with log distance is 60% ); but it is
substantially less correlated with the destination’s supply potential than distance from France (the
correlation between freeness of trade and log supply potential is 40%, much lower than the 78%
correlation between log distance and log supply potential). This greatly alleviates the co-linearity
problem while allowing us to control for the relevant variation induced by bilateral trade barriers
(i.e. calculated based upon their impact on bilateral trade flows).
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 report the results using this constructed freeness of trade measure
as our control for the independent effect of bilateral trade barriers on export skewness. The results
are very similar to our initial ones without any bilateral controls: country size and supply potential
both have a strong and highly significant effect on the skewness of export sales. These effects
are also economically significant. The coefficient on country size can be directly interpreted as an
elasticity for the sales ratio with respect to country GDP. The 0.107 elasticity for the global ratio
implies that an increase in destination GDP from that of the Czech Republic to German GDP (an
increase from the 79th to 99th percentile in the world’s GDP distribution in 2003) would induce
French firms to increase their relative exports of their best product (relative to their next best
global product) by 42.1%: from an observed mean ratio of 20 in 2003 to 28.4.
We now investigate the robustness of this result to different skewness measures, to the sample
of destination countries, and to an additional control for destination GDP per capita. From here
on out, we use our constructed freeness of trade measure to control for bilateral trade barriers.
We report the same set of results for the global sales ratio in Table 3 and for the local ratio in
Table 4. The first column reproduces baseline estimation reported in columns (3) and (6) with the
freeness of trade control. In column (2), we use the sales ratio of the best to third best product as
our dependent skewness variable.40 We then return to sales ratio based on best to next best for
the remaining columns. In order to show that our results are not driven by unmeasured quality
differences between the products shipped to developed and developing countries, we progressively
restrict our sample of country destinations to a subset of richer countries. In column (3) we restrict
destinations to those above the median country income, and in column (4), we only keep the top
39Again, we emphasize that there is a very large class of models that would generate the same procedure for
recovering bilateral freeness of trade.
40We also experimented with the ratio for the second best to third best product, and obtained very similar results.
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Table 2: Global and local export sales ratio: core (m = 0) product to second best (m′ = 1) product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Ratio of core to second product sales’ regressions
Global ratio Local ratio
ln GDP 0.092∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
ln supply potential 0.067∗∗∗ -0.017 0.044∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.018 0.068∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
ln distance -0.063 -0.046∗
(0.043) (0.023)
contiguity 0.013 -0.108
(0.051) (0.081)
colonial link -0.060 -0.041
(0.051) (0.043)
common language 0.023 -0.048
(0.050) (0.038)
RTA 0.066 0.004
(0.059) (0.033)
common currency 0.182∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.037)
both in GATT 0.006 -0.033
(0.046) (0.026)
ln freeness of trade 0.096∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.026) (0.017)
Constant -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 56096 56096 56092 96889 96889 96876
Within R2 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random
effects on firm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estima-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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20% of countries ranked by income (GDP per capita).41 In the fifth and last column, we keep the
full sample of country destinations and add destination GDP per capita as a regressor in order to
directly control for differences in preferences across countries (outside the scope of our theoretical
model) tied to product quality and consumer income.42 All of these different specifications in Tables
3 and 4 confirm the robustness of our baseline results regarding the strong impact of both country
size and geography on the firms’ export ratios.43
Table 3: Global export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m′
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP 0.107∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
ln supply potential 0.044∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016)
ln freeness of trade 0.096∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.026)
ln GDP per cap 0.025
(0.018)
m′ = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 56094 22577 50624 40965 56094
Within R2 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random effects
on firm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Lastly, we show that this effect of country size and geography on export skewness is not limited
to the top 2-3 products exported by a firm to a destination. We now use our different statistics
that measure the skewness of a firm’s export sales over the entire range of exported products. The
first three columns of Table 5 use the standard deviation, Herfindahl index, and Theil index for the
distribution of the firm’s export sales to each destination with our baseline specification (freeness
41Since French firms ship disproportionately more goods to countries with higher incomes, the number of observa-
tions drops very slowly with the number of excluded country destinations.
42In particular, we want to allow consumer income to bias consumption towards higher quality varieties. If within-
firm product quality is negatively related to its distance from the core product, then this would induce a positive
correlation between consumer income and the within-firm skewness of expenditure shares. This is the sign of the
coefficient on GDP per capita that we obtain; that coefficient is statistically significant for the regressions based on
the local product ranking.
43When we restrict the sample of destinations to the top 20% of richest countries, then our co-linearity problem
resurfaces between the supply potential and freeness of trade measures, and the coefficient on supply potential is no
longer statistically significant at the 5% level (only at the 10% level).
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Table 4: Local export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m′
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP 0.077∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008)
ln supply potential 0.068∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
ln freeness of trade 0.028 0.013 0.059 0.092∗ 0.025
(0.017) (0.042) (0.039) (0.052) (0.017)
ln GDP per cap 0.029∗∗
(0.013)
m′ = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 96879 49555 84709 64654 96879
Within R2 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random effects
on firm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
of trade control for bilateral trade barriers and the full sample of destination countries). In the
last three columns, we stick with the Theil index and report the same robustness specifications as
we reported for the local and global sales ratio: We reduce the sample of destinations by country
income, and add GDP per capita as an independent control with the full sample of countries.
Throughout Table 5, we add a cubic polynomial in the number of exported products by the firm to
the destination (those coefficients are not reported). This controls for any mechanical effect of the
number of exported products on the skewness statistic when the number of exported products is
low. These results show how country size and geography increase the skewness of the firms’ entire
exported product mix. Using information on the entire distribution of exported sales increases
the statistical precision of our estimates. The coefficients on country size and supply potential are
significant well beyond the 1% threshold throughout all our different specifications.
In appendix D, we report versions of Tables 3-5 using the number of French exporters to a
destination as a combined measure of competition for French firms in a destination. This measure
of competition across destinations is also very strongly associated with increased export skewness
in all of our specifications.
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Table 5: Skewness measures for export sales of all products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP 0.141∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
ln supply potential 0.125∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln freeness of trade 0.096∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.036) (0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.022) (0.009)
ln GDP per cap 0.013∗∗
(0.005)
Dep. Var. s.d. ln x herf theil theil theil theil
Destination GDP/cap all all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 82090 82090 82090 73029 57076 82090
Within R2 0.107 0.164 0.359 0.356 0.341 0.359
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random effects on firm-demeaned
data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All columns include a cubic polynomial of the number
of products exported by the firm to the country (also included in the within R2).
7 Economic Significance: Relationship Between Skewness and Productivity
We now quantitatively assess the economic significance of our main results. We have identified sig-
nificant differences in skewness across destinations, and want to relate those differences in skewness
to differences in competition across destinations – via the lens of our theoretical model. These dif-
ferences in competition are important because tougher competition induces an aggregate increase
in productivity – holding technology fixed. In a closed economy, we showed in appendix B how
firm productivity – measured either as output per worker Φ(c) or deflated sales per worker ΦR(c)
– increases when competition increases (the cutoff cD decreases). This effect holds even when the
firm’s product range M(c) does not change, as it is driven by the increased skewness in the product
mix (towards the best performing products). In the same appendix, we also define parallel measures
of firm productivity Φlh(c) and ΦR,lh(c) for the bundle of products exported by firm c from l to h.
Similarly, these productivity measures increase with competition in that destination (lower chh) due
to the same intra-firm reallocations across products driven by the increase in skewness. Since our
available data does not include measures of firm productivity, we must rely on the functional forms
of our theoretical model to quantitatively relate export skewness to competition and productivity.
This represents a significant departure from our empirical approach up to this point, which has
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avoided relying on those functional forms.
In Section 3, we defined aggregate productivity Φ¯ and Φ¯R as the aggregate counterparts to
Φ(c) and ΦR(c), and showed that both aggregate measured were identical, and inversely related to
the cost cutoff. This describes the overall response of productivity to changes in the toughness of
competition in the closed economy. We define the aggregate productivity for all products exported
from l to h in a similar way: Φ¯lh and Φ¯R,lh are the aggregate counterparts to the firm productivity
measures Φlh(c) and ΦR,lh(c). In appendix C, we show that these two alternate measures coincide
(just like they do for aggregate productivity in the closed economy) and are inversely proportional
to the cost cutoff chh (the toughness of competition in the export destination). Thus, our theo-
retical model predicts that increases in the toughness of competition in a destination – measured
as percentage decreases in the destination cutoff – lead to proportional increases in aggregate pro-
ductivity (same percentage change as the cutoff). This aggregate productivity response combines
the effects of skewness on firm productivity, holding the product range fixed, as well as reallocation
effects across products when the number of products changes, and reallocation effects across firms.
However, because product market shares continuously drop to zero as competition toughens, the
contribution of the product extensive margin (adding/dropping products) to productivity changes
is second order, while the contribution of product skewness to productivity changes is first order.
Thus, the unit elasticity between productivity and toughness of competition is driven by the effects
of competition on product skewness. This is the key new channel that we emphasize in this paper.
Our main results in the previous section have quantified the link between observable country
characteristics and export skewness. In particular, we have shown how differences in GDP induce
significant differences in skewness for French exporters. We now quantitatively determine what
differences in competition (across countries) would yield those same observed differences in export
skewness. This allows us to associate differences in competition with the differences in GDP, in
terms of their effect on the skewness of exports. In our theoretical model, the relationship between
competition in a destination (the cutoff chh) and export skewness for firm c from l (measured as the
ratio of a firm’s exports of its core product, m = 0, to its next best performing product, m′ = 1) is
given by (26):
rrlh(c) =
rlh(v (m, c))
rlh(v (m′, c))
=
(chh)
2 − (τlhc)2
(chh)
2 − (τlhc/ω)2
. (27)
Our results in Tables 3 and 4 measure the average elasticity of this skewness measure with respect
to destination h GDP – across all French exporters that export their top 2 products (global or
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local definition) to h. Using (27), we compute the average elasticity of this skewness measure with
respect to competition in h (the cutoff chh):
d ln rrlh
d ln chh
= −2k1− ω
2
ω2
(chhτlh)
2
(ω2chh/τlh)k
∫ ω2chh/τlh
0
ck+1[
c2hh − (τlhc)2
] [
c2hh − (τlhc/ω)2
]dc
= −2k1− ω
2
ω2k
∫ ω2
0
xk+1
(1− x2) (ω2 − x2)dx where x ≡ (τlh/chh) c ∈ [0, ω
2]
≡ f(ω, k)
Here, we have averaged over all firms in l selling at least 3 products to h as the elasticity is
not defined for some firms exporting 2 products, who become single product exporters when the
cutoff chh decreases. We note that this average elasticity can be written as a function of just
two model parameters: ω (the ladder step size), and k (the shape of the Pareto distribution for
cost/productivity). We thus need empirical estimates of just those two coefficients. Several papers
have estimated the Pareto shape coefficients k. Crozet and Koenig (2010) estimate a range for
kˆ between 1.34 and 4.43 for French exporters (by sector) while Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2011) estimate kˆ = 4.87 for all French firms. This range coincides well with estimates from other
countries: Corcos et al (forthcoming) estimate kˆ = 1.79 across European firms, and Bernard et al
(2003) estimate kˆ = 3.6 for U.S. firms. We report estimates of f(ωˆ, kˆ) for kˆ between 1.34 and 4.87.
In order to estimate ωˆ, we use our theoretical model to derive an estimation equation for
ϑ ≡ k lnω based on our product-destination export data (see appendix C). This yields a very precise
estimate for ϑ, ϑˆ = −.13, which we use to recover ωˆ, given a choice for kˆ. Given the small standard
error for ϑˆ, differences in ωˆ will be driven by our choice of kˆ; however, any alternate assumption for ϑˆ
will have the same effect on ωˆ as a proportional change in kˆ. This completes our empirical derivation
for the average elasticity of skewness with respect to competition, d ln rrlh/d ln chh ≡ f(ω, k). This
elasticity ranges from .635 for kˆ = 1.34 to 2.34 for kˆ = 4.87; it is 1.52 at the midpoint for kˆ = 3.11.
With estimates of this elasticity in hand, we can evaluate the economic significance of our
previous results from Tables 3 and 4. In those tables, we reported an average elasticity of skewness
to country GDP between .06 and .11. Dividing those elasticities by our estimate for d ln rrlh/d ln chh
yields the change in competition that would induce the same change in skewness as a doubling of
country GDP. In our theoretical model, those changes in competition are proportional to changes
in aggregate productivity for the bundle of goods sold in that destination. Viewed through this
lens, the economic impact of the changes in skewness are quite large. For a doubling of country
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GDP, they imply changes in productivity between 2.56% and 17.3%. At our midpoint for kˆ, the
implied productivity changes are between 3.95% and 7.24%.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of multi-product firms that highlights how differences in
market size and geography affect the within-firm distribution of export sales across destinations.
This effect on the firms’ product mix choice is driven by variations in the toughness of competition
across markets. Tougher competition induces a downward shift in the distribution of markups
across all products, and increases the relative market share of the better performing products. We
test these predictions for a comprehensive set of French exporters, and find that market size and ge-
ography indeed have a very strong impact on their exported product mix across world destinations:
French firms skew their export sales towards their better performing products in big destination
markets, and markets where many exporters from around the world compete (high foreign supply
potential markets). We have obtained these results without imposing the specific functional forms
(for demand, for the geometric product ladder, and for the Pareto inverse cost draws) that we used
in our theoretical model. We therefore view our results as giving a strong indication of substantial
differences in competition across export markets – rather than providing goodness of fit test to our
specific model (and its functional forms). We cannot measure markups directly but the strong link
between tougher competition and a more skewed product mix is suggestive of substantial markup
adjustments by exporters across destinations. In any event, trade models based on exogenous
markups cannot explain this strong significant link between destination market characteristics and
the within-firm skewness of export sales (after controlling for bilateral trade costs).
Theoretically, we showed how such an increase in skewness towards better performing products
(driven by tougher competition) would also be reflected in higher firm productivity. We cannot
directly test this link without productivity data. Instead, we have leaned more heavily on the func-
tional forms of our theoretical model. A calibrated fit to that model reveals that these productivity
effects are potentially quite large.
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Appendix
A Trade Liberalization
In this appendix, we briefly discuss the predictions of our model regarding trade liberalization
(unilateral and multilateral) in the context of a 2 country version of our model. The main message
is that the effects of trade liberalization on aggregate variables (competition, productivity, welfare)
are identical to those analyzed in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in the context of single-product
firms. However, our current model allows us to translate those aggregate changes into predictions
for the responses of multi-product firms. The main link is the one we have emphasized (both
theoretically and empirically) in the cross-section of destinations: how changes in competition
lead to associated changes in the multi-product firms’ product mix and hence to changes in their
productivity. In this respect, the predictions are starkly different than the case of single-product
firms where productivity (output per worker) is exogenously fixed independently of the competitive
environment.
Equation (21) summarizes the effect of trade costs on competition in every market (the resulting
cost cutoff chh) via the matrix of trade freeness P = [ρlh] where ρlh ≡ τ−klh < 1. In a two country
world, this simplifies to:
chh =
1− ρhl
1− ρhlρlh
(
γφ
ΩLh
) 1
k+2
, l 6= h. (A.1)
Equation (22) then expresses the resulting product variety in country h as a function of that cutoff.
The determination of the cutoff in (A.1) is very similar to the case of single-product firms: this
is the case where Ω = 1. Trade liberalization thus induces a similar response as in the single-
product case. Bilateral trade liberalization (higher ρlh and ρhl) increases competition in both
countries (lower cutoffs chh and cll). On the other hand, unilateral trade liberalization in country
h (higher ρlh with ρhl remaining unchanged) results in weaker competition in h (higher chh) and
tougher competition in its trading partner l (lower cll). This divergence is due to the impact of the
asymmetric liberalization on the firms’ entry decisions: unilateral trade liberalization by h increases
the incentives for entry in its trading parter l; entry in h is reduced, while entry in l increases. We
can also define a short-run equilibrium in a similar way to the one defined for single-product firms
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). With entry fixed in the short run, unilateral trade liberalization
will then increase competition in the liberalizing country, due to the increase in import competition
(in the long run, the increase in import competition is more than offset by the effects of exit). An
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analysis of preferential trade liberalization would also lead to similar resuls on competition as those
described in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
B Tougher Competition and Firm Productivity
In Section 3 we argued that tougher competition induces improvements in firm productivity through
its impact on a firm’s product mix. Here we show that both firm productivity measures, output
per worker Φ(c) and deflated sales per worker ΦR(c), increase for all multi-product firms when
competition increases (cD decreases). We provide proofs for the closed as well as the open economy.
In both cases we proceed in two steps. First, we show that, holding a firm’s product scope constant,
firm productivity over that product scope increases whenever competition increases. Then, we
extend the argument by continuity to cover the case where tougher competition induces a change
in product scope.
B.1 Closed Economy
Consider a firm with cost c producing M(c) varieties. Output per worker is given by
Φ(c) =
Q(c)
C(c)
=
∑M(c)−1
m=0 q (v (m, c))∑M(c)−1
m=0 v (m, c) q (v (m, c))
=
L
2γ
∑M(c)−1
m=0 (cD − ω−mc)
L
2γ
∑M(c)−1
m=0 ω
−m (cD − ω−mc)
.
For a fixed product scope M with 1 < M ≤M(c), this can be written as
Φ(c) =
ωM (ω − 1)
ω (ωM − 1)
M
c
cD − cM
ω(ωM−1)
ωM (ω−1)
cD − cω(ωM+1)ωM (ω+1)
, (B.1)
subject to c ∈ [cDωM , cDωM−1]. Differentiating (B.1) with respect to cD implies that
dΦ(c)
dcD
< 0 ⇐⇒ cω
(
ωM + 1
)
ωM (ω + 1)
>
c
M
ω
(
ωM − 1)
ωM (ω − 1)
or, equivalently, if and only if
M >
(1 + ω)
(
1− ωM)
(1 + ωM ) (1− ω) . (B.2)
This is always the case for M > 1: the left- and right-hand sides are identical for M = 0 and
M = 1, and the right hand side is increasing and concave in M . This proves that, holding M > 1
constant, a firm’s output per worker is larger in a market where competition is tougher (lower cD).
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Even when product scope M drops due to the decrease in cD, output per worker must still
increase due to the continuity of Φ(c) with respect to cD (both Q(c) and C(c) are continuous in
cD as the firm produces zero units of a variety right before it is dropped when competition gets
tougher). To see this, consider a large downward change in the cutoff cD. The result for given
M tells us that output per worker for a firm with given c increases on all ranges of cD where the
number of varieties produced does not change. This just leaves a discrete number of cD’s where
the firm changes the number of products produced. Since Φ(c) is continuous at those cD’s, and
increasing everywhere else, it must be increasing everywhere.
The unavailability of data on physical output often leads to a measure of productivity in terms
of deflated sales per worker. Over the fixed product scope M with 1 < M ≤ M(c), this alternate
productivity measure is defined as
ΦR(c) =
R(c)/P¯
C(c)
=
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1
cD
M (cD)
2 − c2ω2 ω2M−1
ω2M (ω−1)(ω+1)
cDcω
ωM−1
ωM (ω−1) − c2ω2 ω
2M−1
ω2M (ω−1)(ω+1)
, (B.3)
subject to c ∈ [cDωM , cDωM−1]. Differentiating (B.3) with respect to cD then yields
d
(
R(c)/P¯
C(c)
)
dcD
= −1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1 + ωM
1− ωM
Mω2M
(
1− ω2) (cD)2 − 2cωM+1 (1 + ω) (1− ωM) cD + c2ω2 (1− ω2M)
(cD)
2 [ωM (ω + 1) cD − cω (ωM + 1)]2
< 0.
Here, we have used the fact that c ∈ [cDωM , cDωM−1] implies
Mω2M
(
1− ω2) (c/ωM)2 − 2cωM+1 (1 + ω) (1− ωM) (c/ωM) > 0.
This proves that, holding M > 1 constant, this alternative productivity measure ΦR(c) also in-
creases when competition is tougher (lower cD). The same reasoning applies to the case where
tougher competition induces a reduction in product scope M .
Note that, in the special case of M = 1, we have
ΦR(c) =
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
(
1
c
+
1
cD
)
.
Hence, whereas tougher competition (lower cD) has no impact on the output per worker Φ(c) of
a single-product firm, it still raises deflated sales per worker ΦR(c). This is due to the fact that
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deflated sales per worker are also affected by markup changes when the toughness of competition
changes.
B.2 Open Economy
Consider a firm with cost c selling Mlh(c) varieties from country l to country h. Exported output
per worker is given by
Φlh(c) ≡ Qlh(c)
Clh(c)
=
∑Mlh(c)−1
m=0 chh − τlhω−mc∑Mlh(c)−1
m=0 (τlhω
−mc) (chh − τ lhω−mc)
.
For a fixed product scope M with 1 < M ≤Mlh(c), this can be written as
Φlh(c) =
ωM (1− ω)
ω (1− ωM )
M
cτlh
chh − cτlhM
ω(1−ωM)
ωM (1−ω)
chh − cτlh ω(1+ωM )ωM (1+ω)
, (B.4)
subject to cτlh ∈ [chhωM , chhωM−1]. Differentiating (B.4) with respect to chh yields
dΦlh(c)
dchh
< 0 ⇐⇒ cτlh
ω
(
ωM + 1
)
ωM (ω + 1)
>
cτlh
M
ω
(
ωM − 1)
ωM (ω − 1)
This must hold for M > 1 (see (B.2)). Hence, tougher competition (lower chh) in the destination
market increases exported output per worker. As in the closed economy, the fact that output per
worker is continuous at a discrete number of chh’s and decreasing in chh everywhere else implies
that it is decreasing in chh everywhere.
We now turn to productivity measured as deflated export sales per worker. Over the fixed
product scope M with 1 < M ≤M(c), this is defined as
ΦR,lh(c) =
Rlh(c)/P¯h
Clh(c)
=
1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1
chh
M (chh)
2 − c2 (τlh)2 ω2 ω2M−1ω2M (ω−1)(ω+1)
chhcτlhω
ωM−1
ωM (ω−1) − c2 (τlh)2 ω2 ω
2M−1
ω2M (ω−1)(ω+1)
, (B.5)
subject to cτlh ∈ [chhωM , chhωM−1]. Differentiating (B.5) with respect to chh yields
dΦR,lh(c)
dchh
= −1
2
k + 2
k + 1
1 + ωM
1− ωM
Mω2M
(
1− ω2) (chh)2 − 2cτ lhωM+1 (1 + ω) (1− ωM) chh + c2 (τlh)2 ω2 (1− ω2M)
(chh)
2 [ωM (ω + 1) chh − cτlhω (ωM + 1)]2
< 0.
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The last inequality holds since cτlh ∈ [chhωM , chhωM−1] implies
Mω2M
(
1− ω2) (cτlh/ωM)2 − 2cτlhωM+1 (1 + ω) (1− ωM) (cτlh/ωM) > 0.
This proves that, holding M > 1 constant, productivity measured as deflated export sales per
worker increases with tougher competition in the export market (lower chh). The same applies to
the case where the tougher competition induces a response in the exported product scope M , as
ΦR,lh(c) is continuous in chh.
C Calibration of Relationship Between Skewness and Productivity
C.1 Aggregate Productivity Index for Bundle of Exported Goods
In the previous appendix section, we defined productivity indices for firm’s c bundle of exported
goods from l to h as the output per worker associated with that bundle of exports:
Φlh(c) ≡ Qlh(c)
Clh(c)
and ΦR,lh(c) =
Rlh(c)/P¯h
Clh(c)
,
where the R subscript are productivity measures based on deflated sales as a measure of firm
output. The aggregate counterparts for all bilateral exports from l to h are just the same measures
of output per worker computed for the aggregate bundle of exported goods:
Φ¯lh ≡
∫ ωmchh/τlh
0 Qlh(c)dG(c)∫ ωmchh/τlh
0 Clh(c)dG(c)
=
k + 2
k
1
chh
,
Φ¯R,lh ≡
[∫ ωmchh/τlh
0 Rlh(c)dG(c)
]
/P¯h∫ ωmchh/τlh
0 Clh(c)dG(c)
=
k + 2
k
1
chh
.
Just like the case of aggregate productivity in the closed economy, our two aggregate productivity
measures overlap and are inversely proportional to the cutoff chh in the export destination h.
C.2 Estimating the Product Ladder Step Size ω
We obtain an estimating equation for the ladder step size ω by aggregating all the product export
sales across firms (for bilateral exports from l to h) that are at the same ladder step m:
Rlh(m) =
∫ chh/(τlhω−m)
0
Rlh(c,m)d
(
c
cM
)k
=
[
L
γ (k + 2)
(chh)
k+2
(τlhcM )
k
]
ωkm.
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Thus, Rlh(0) represents aggregate exports of core products from l to h; Rlh(1) for the second best
performing product, and so forth for the product that is m steps from the core product. This
implies a linear relationship between the log of product export sales lnRlh(m) and its associated
ladder step m, with a slope given by ϑ ≡ k lnω and an intercept that varies across bilateral country
pairs. We can easily compute Rlh(m) from our data by aggregating firm-product export sales from
France to any destination h – across all products at the same ladder step m. A linear regression of
lnRlh(m) on m with destination h fixed effects (capturing the term in the brackets) will then yield
our estimate for ϑˆ (origin country l is held fixed for France).
We visually summarize this regression in Figure C.1, where we have eliminated the destination
fixed-effects by demeaning the export sales lnRlh(m) and the associated product m by destination
h. By construction, this regression must deliver a negative fitted line. However, Figure C.1 also
clearly reveals that the linear relationship provides an excellent fit. The figure also reveals that our
slope coefficient ϑˆ = −.13 is very tightly estimated, with no appreciable slope variation within a
99% confidence interval.
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Figure C.1: Regression yielding estimate of ϑ
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D Robustness to Alternate Measure of Toughness of Competition
As we mentioned in the main text, we repeat our main estimation procedures using the number
of French exporters to a destination as a combined measure of the toughness of competition (for
French firms) in a destination. We begin by showing the scatterplots of the mean global ratio
plotted against this alternate competition measure (direct parallel to Figures (2 and 3). Figure D.1
clearly shows that there is also a very strong increasing relationship between the global ratio and
this alternate measure of competition.
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Figure D.1: Mean Global Ratio and # French exporters in Destination Country in 2003
We next replicate Tables 3-5 replacing country GDP and supply potential with the number of
French exporters to the destination (in logs). Those tables clearly show that all our results are
robust to this alternate measure of competition across destinations.1
1We also ran some specifications using all three competition measures jointly (GDP, supply potential, and number
of exporters). Adding the third competition regressor does not affect the impact of the our first two baseline
competition measures. The independent effect of the third measure remained significant for the global and overall
skewness specifications.
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Table D.1: Global export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m′
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln # French exporters 0.226∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024)
ln freeness of trade -0.034 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.019 0.018 -0.029
(0.032) (0.029) (0.037) (0.043) (0.033)
ln GDP per cap 0.031∗
(0.019)
m′ = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 56094 22577 50624 40965 56094
Within R2 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.005
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random effects
on firm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table D.2: Local export sales ratio: core product (m = 0) to product m′
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln # French exporters 0.178∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.027) (0.026) (0.035) (0.018)
ln freeness of trade -0.056∗∗ -0.096∗ -0.026 0.027 -0.040
(0.026) (0.050) (0.045) (0.058) (0.026)
ln GDP per cap 0.049∗∗∗
(0.013)
m′ = 1 2 1 1 1
Destination GDP/cap all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 96879 49555 84709 64654 96879
Within R2 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.007
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random effects
on firm-demeaned data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.3: Skewness measures for export sales of all products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln # French exporters 0.348∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
ln freeness of trade -0.065 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.007 -0.024∗
(0.048) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012)
ln GDP per cap 0.022∗∗∗
(0.006)
Dep. Var. s.d. ln x herf theil theil theil theil
Destination GDP/cap all all all top 50% top 20% all
Observations 82090 82090 82090 73029 57076 82090
Within R2 0.106 0.163 0.358 0.356 0.341 0.359
Note: All columns use Wooldridge’s (2006) procedure: country-specific random effects on firm-demeaned
data, with a robust covariance matrix estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All columns include a cubic polynomial of the number
of products exported by the firm to the country (also included in the within R2).
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